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Abstract
We show how cryptographic protocols using Diffie–Hellman primitives, i.e., modular exponenti-
ation on a fixed generator, can be encoded in Horn clauses modulo associativity and commutativity.
In order to obtain a sufficient criterion of security, we design a complete (but not sound in general)
resolution procedure for a class of flattened clauses modulo simple equational theories, including
associativity–commutativity. We report on a practical implementation of this algorithm in the MOP
modular platform for automated proving; in particular, we obtain the first fully automated proof of
security of the IKA.1 initial key agreement protocol in the so-called pure eavesdropper model.
© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
It is generally admitted that verifying cryptographic protocols is important. One popular
kind of model is that of Dolev and Yao (after [15], see [9] for a survey), where: the intruder
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can read and write on every communication channel, and in effect has full control over
the network; the intruder may encrypt, decrypt, build and destruct pairs, as many times
as it wishes; and, finally, cryptographic means are assumed to be perfect. The latter in
particular means that the only way to compute the plaintext M from the ciphertext {M}K
is to decrypt the latter using the inverse key K−1. It also means that no ciphertext can
be confused with any message that is not a ciphertext, and that {M}K = {M ′}K ′ implies
M = M ′ and K = K ′. Thus, messages can be simply encoded as first-order terms, a fact
which has been used by many authors; no algebraic law, except the trivial one M = M ,
holds on messages.
While this is a fine assumption if one uses encryption algorithms such as DES, RC5 or
IDEA for example, modular exponentiation and elliptic curve group operations definitely
obey non-trivial algebraic laws. In this paper, we are specially interested in modeling
Diffie–Hellman primitives [14]. While these are usually implemented through modular
exponentiation, the general framework can be described by the use of one unary function
e and an associative–commutative (AC), or even an Abelian group law ⊕ [26,43] with unit
0. For example, the original Diffie–Hellman protocol for establishing a common secret
key between two principals A and B has A send the message e(Na) to B, where Na is a
nonce (implemented as a fresh, random number) created by A, then B send the message
e(Nb) to A, where Nb is another nonce created by B. Assuming that, once you know e(M)
and M ′, you may deduce e(M ⊕ M ′), both A and B can build the common secret key
e(Na ⊕ Nb). The standard implementation is by using numbers in Z/pZ∗ (p prime) for
messages, letting e(M) be gM mod p for some primitive element (generator) of Z/pZ∗,
and ⊕ be multiplication of exponents; once you know e(M) = gM and M ′, you indeed
know e(M ⊕ M ′) = gMM ′ = (gM)M ′ . Note that we may alternatively use other groups,
e.g., an elliptic curve on Z/pZ for ⊕ instead.
The Diffie–Hellman primitive is used not only in the famous Diffie–Hellman protocol,
but also in the so-called Diffie–Hellman ephemeral key exchange [20], and in some variants
of El Gamal encryption and signature. In this paper, we shall take the IKA.1 group key
agreement protocol [41] as a running example of our verification techniques for protocols
using Diffie–Hellman primitives— e, ⊕, 0 as above.
Now ⊕ is associative, commutative, and has 0 as a unit. For instance, e(M ⊕ M ′) should
be considered as equal to e(M ′ ⊕ M), otherwise the Diffie–Hellman protocol just does not
work. In IKA.1, not just commutativity, but also associativity is required for the protocol to
work as intended. This calls for a modification of the Dolev–Yao model, where messages
are taken to be terms modulo an equational theory: here, the theory ACU of associativity,
commutativity and unit 0 of ⊕; and, to be more faithful to implementations based on
Abelian groups such as Z/pZ∗, the richer theory of Abelian groups.
Contributions of this paper. the main contribution of this paper is an automated proof
search technique providing a computable sufficient criterion for establishing the security of
cryptographic protocols in the presence of associative and commutative function symbols,
such as in Diffie–Hellman-like exchanges. Dealing with associativity and commutativity
automatically, and efficiently, is the challenge here. While most of this paper is concerned
with proving the correctness of the algorithm, automation and efficiency are evaluated on
an actual implementation, in Section 5.
More generally, we provide a terminating algorithm that, when given some sets of
first-order Horn clauses in a specific class, called AC-tree automata clauses, outputs “sat-
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isfiable” only if the input set is satisfiable, therefore providing a definite proof of security
in case the input clauses represent a given protocol together with initial assumptions and
security properties.
As far as security properties are concerned, we deal with so-called non-reachability
properties, of which secrecy is a prime example. To be precise, we are able to deal with
any property that is a finite conjunction of atomic formulae, as in [10]. We also refer the
reader to the latter paper for a justification why Horn clauses are an adequate tool for
modeling cryptographic protocols and security properties in general.
As far as modeling security protocols using Horn clauses is concerned, it has been
shown in [26] and in the third author’s PhD thesis [43] how special formats of first-order
Horn clauses modulo ACU could be put to good use to describe faithfully the IKA.1
protocol, as well as non-reachability of insecure configurations. These formats can be seen
as extensions of tree automata [8] to both so-called two-way tree automata and equational
theories. We recap the third author’s encoding of IKA.1 for a given number of principals in
Section 3. In Section 5, we shall show that it is secure in the so-called pure eavesdropper
security model. (It is well-known that IKA.1 is insecure in the other models we shall
consider here, see [31].)
The point is that we establish these results by an automated method: once the clauses
describing the protocol are written, the security of the protocol, which reduces to show-
ing that the given set of clauses is satisfiable, is shown automatically by the MOP tool,
developed by the second author [38]. In principle, the decidability results of Verma [43]
could be used to this end, but the corresponding algorithms are not primitive recursive;
Verma’s [45] algorithms are more efficient (elementary) and may provide a basis for an
exact verification method.
In this paper, we present an approximate resolution technique that works in double
exponential time, and is fast enough in practice. This technique is described in Section 4,
which is the technical core of the paper.
In short, although the IKA.1 protocol can be modeled using previously known decidable
classes of Horn clauses modulo AC, the complexity of these classes is mostly unknown.
We provide efficient techniques which work fast enough in practice and have actually been
used to verify this protocol. Moreover our techniques are general enough to establish the
satisfiability of fairly general clause sets modulo AC (including e.g., clause sets belonging
to the classes shown undecidable in [45]), as well as other theories. This may be of interest
in other fields, too.
Outline. We first review related work in Section 2. We recapitulate the third author’s
encoding of the IKA.1 protocol in Section 3. This will give the reader a hint of the kind of
clauses that we need to handle. Section 4 describes a conservative approximation procedure
to solve such clause sets. This is based on resolution techniques [2], plus a technical result
that allows one to replace full subderivations by calls to a specialized oracle. Although
implementing the corresponding oracle in the case of the theory AC and extensions may
seem challenging, we show how it can be implemented efficiently using counting mechan-
isms in Section 4.6. This has been implemented in the MOP prover, a modular platform for
implementing resolution provers on general algebras, including algebras of terms modulo
an equational theory [38]. We report on practical experiments with MOP running on IKA.1
in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
222 J. Goubault-Larrecq et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 64 (2005) 219–251
2. Related work
2.1. Verifying cryptographic protocols modulo algebraic laws, and
Diffie–Hellman primitives
The observation that messages in the Dolev–Yao model are just first-order terms is an
incitation to encode protocols, Dolev–Yao intruders, security assumptions, and even secur-
ity properties, using first-order logic [47,4]. Cryptographic protocols can also be analyzed
using tree automata [8], as shown in [32,21], or using set constraints [7,1], or using rewrite
systems [19]. A unified view, relating tree automata, set constraints and first-order logic, is
provided in [23,25].
Extensions to encryption primitives obeying algebraic laws are now being explored by
several researchers. The first decision procedures for classes of clause sets modulo equa-
tional intruders including the theory of associativity and commutativity of ⊕ are, to our
knowledge, due to Goubault-Larrecq and Verma [26]. This includes the theory of exclusive
or, and was illustrated on a model of the IKA.1 protocol [41] for finitely many principals,
using the e, ⊕, and 0 symbols described in Section 1; see also [43].
Comon-Lundh and Cortier [11] apply resolution techniques to the analysis of certain
classes of clause sets in the presence of exclusive-or, that is, of a ⊕ operation that is associ-
ative, commutative, has a unit 0, and obeys the cancellation law M ⊕ M = 0. Just like we
do here, they restrict the use of resolution, and add new rules to retain completeness. They
show how this can be used to model and analyze a simple protocol using exclusive-or. The
complexity is prohibitive, though, and no implementation exists of their technique. The
same can be said of the automata-theoretic procedures of Goubault-Larrecq Verma [26]
and Verma [45,44], although the complexity of the latter are mostly unknown yet. One can
also cite the works of [6] and [12], who established the decidability of protocol insecurity
in the presence of exclusive-or. While Chevalier et al. [6] show that this problem is NP-
complete, Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov [12] show that a slightly more general version of
the same problem is DEXPTIME-complete. As far as we know, none of these algorithms
has been implemented.
The procedures above are exact, in the sense that given an input clause set (possibly
approximating the given protocol), they always return true if the clause set is satisfiable,
and no otherwise. Our procedures are approximate: they always return, and if the answer
is true then the input clause set is satisfiable, but if the answer is false, then we cannot
reach any conclusion. This is in the spirit of abstract interpretation (see [13] for a nice
introduction).
Accordingly, the complexity of our procedure is lower (double exponential time, still),
and has been implemented by the second author. We will not report on experience with ex-
clusive or here, just because we did not conduct any experiment on this theory. It should be
clear that our techniques apply to the case of exclusive or as well, and on other theories, too.
We shall report on results we obtained with the group key exchange protocol IKA.1
[41]. This protocol, and several others related to it, were scrutinized already by Pereira
and Quisquater [34]. Their conclusions agree with ours. However, past experience has
shown that verifying protocols by hand, even when proofs have been published in refer-
eed conferences, is not enough. The most striking example is, of course, the (in)famous
Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol [33], which was only found vulnerable, using
formal methods, 17 years later [29].
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Since the work of Goubault-Larrecq and Verma [26], several authors have proposed
formal models of the Diffie–Hellman primitive. As indicated in Section 1, our model is
abstract, and is based on a unary function e, a binary associative–commutative operation
⊕, with unit 0. The work of Chevalier et al. [5] is based on a more precise model, as they use
a binary function Exp instead of our unary e. Exp(M,N) is meant to denote M to the ex-
ponent N , so our e(N) can be seen as Exp(g,N) for a fixed generator g. This is apparently
richer, but no equation is included that relates applications of Exp to different generators.
In particular, the equation Exp(g,N) ⊕ Exp(g′, N) = Exp(g ⊕ g′, N) is not considered
(remember that in the implementation of Diffie–Hellman using modular exponentiation,
⊕ is multiplication). If a fixed generator g is used throughout, then we believe that their
model and ours are equivalent. The only difference would be that, whereas Chevalier et
al. reason modulo the equation Exp(g,M ⊕ N) = Exp(Exp(g,M),N), we dispense with
it and replace it by a deduction rule stating that, once you know e(M) and N , then you
know e(M ⊕ N). Replacing certain equations by deduction rules was explicitly used in
[4], typically for equations of the form decrypt(encrypt(M,K),K−1) = M . This trick
is already the basis of all equational reasoning in NRL [30]; replacing some equations by
deduction rules is an old trick in automated deduction. We shall call this the Meadows
trick. As noticed e.g., in [28], while this works for some equational theories, this definitely
fails with associativity and commutativity.
By far the most faithful model of modular exponentiation today is the E′3,5 model of
Kapur et al. [28], which includes all of Chevalier et al.’s equations, plus others, includ-
ing the above formula Exp(g,N) ⊕ Exp(g′, N) = Exp(g ⊕ g′, N). To be precise, Kapur
et al. use two distinct symbols, · and ◦, for multiplication outside of exponents, and inside
exponents respectively, which need not be related; · is an Abelian group law, while ◦ is a
commutative monoid law. Several restrictions, all extending Chevalier et al.’s model and
ours, are shown to give rise to a decidable unification problem, using extensions of Gröbner
basis techniques. This entails that reachability properties (e.g., secrecy) are decidable in
this model, since resolution then terminates provided only non-looping protocols with only
finitely many sessions are considered. Chevalier et al. [5] shows that the problem (in their
slightly more restricted model) is even NP-complete in this case. We are not aware of any
implementation of Chevalier et al.’s technique; while they claim that their procedure will
find a known attack on IKA.1, no evidence is given that this was obtained by running any
actual program.
One may think of models that would be even more faithful to modular exponenti-
ation. We may consider the equation Exp(g,N) ⊕ Exp(g′, N) = Exp(g ⊕ g′, N), i.e.,
make · and ◦ the same operation in Kapur et al.’s notation. We may also realize that there
is another group law + called addition modulo p, such that Exp(g,M) ⊕ Exp(g,N) =
Exp(g,M + N). Or that + and ⊕ together form a commutative ring, even a field when
p is prime. (But then this is not an equational theory any longer.) Or even that the Jacobi
symbol
(
Exp(M,N)
p
)
equals Exp
((
M
p
)
, N
)
; all this can be used by an intruder, if only
to get one bit of information on the plaintext M in the latter case [20]. We must
stop this inflation at some point. The theories in [28], at the frontier of decidability
and undecidability, seem to be a natural limit. However, our techniques are not limited
by this fact, since we use approximations anyway. . . and will never need to unify any
term modulo the given theory. (We only use unification as a tool in proving complete-
ness.)
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2.2. Resolution
We shall make extensive use of resolution theorem proving techniques [37]. Using res-
olution to decide subclasses of first-order logic formulas was pioneered by [27], and earlier
by Maslov (see [17]). Standard refinements of resolution used in this area are hyperresol-
ution and ordered resolution. We shall use ordered resolution with selection [2]. Previous
work on cryptographic protocol verification using this rule include [11], and mostly [4],
where it is used as a preprocessing step.
We now introduce some definitions. Let  be a strict stable ordering on atomic formu-
las. By stable we mean that if P(s)  Q(t), then P(sσ )  Q(tσ ) for any substitution σ ,
where tσ denotes the application of σ to the term t . (Wlog, we restrict to unary predicate
symbols.) A literal is either a positive literal +P(t), or a negative literal −P(t). A clause
is a disjunction of literals ±1P1(t1) ∨ ±2P2(t2) ∨ · · · ∨ ±kPk(tk). A Horn clause is one
containing at most one positive literal: we also write P(t) ⇐ P1(t1), . . . , Pn(tn) for the
definite clause +P(t) ∨ −P1(t1), . . . ,−Pn(tn), and ⊥ ⇐ P1(t1), . . . , Pn(tn) for the goal
clause −P1(t1), . . . ,−Pn(tn). Let sel be a function mapping each clause to a subset of its
negative literals.
Definition 1. Orderered resolution with selection is the rule that allows one to derive the
conclusion (below the bar) provided we have already derived the premises (above), where:
C1 ∨ +A11 ∨ · · · ∨ +A1m1
. . . C′ ∨ −A′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −A′n
Cn ∨ +An1 ∨ · · · ∨ +Anmn
(C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn ∨ C′)σ
(i) n  1, m1  1, . . . , mn  1;
(ii) σ = mgu(A11 .= · · · .= A1m1 .= A′1, . . . , An1 .= · · · .= Anmn .= A′n), i.e., σ is the most
general unifier (mgu) of the equations A11 .= · · · .= A1m1 .= A′1, . . . , An1 .= · · · .=
Anmn
.= A′n;
(iii) for every i, 1  i  n, sel(Ci ∨ +Ai1 ∨ · · · ∨ +Aini ) = ∅ and Ai1, . . . , Aini are
maximal atomic formulae in Ci ∨ +Ai1 ∨ · · · ∨ +Aini with respect to ;
(iv) sel(C′ ∨ −A′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −A′n) = {−A′1, . . . ,−A′n} /= ∅, or sel(C′ ∨ −A′1 ∨ · · ·∨ −A′n) = ∅ and A′1, . . . , A′n are maximal in C′ ∨ −A′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −A′n with respect
to .
For additional definitions, see [2]. It is implicit in the rule above that all premises have
been renamed so that no two premises share any free variable. The right premise is called
the main premise, all others are side premises. The conclusion is often called a resolvent
of the premises.
In the case of Horn clauses, this simplifies to the rule:
A1 ⇐ B1 . . . An ⇐ Bn A ⇐ B, A′1, . . . , A′n
(A ⇐ B,B1, . . . ,Bn)σ
where B, B1, . . . , Bn are bodies, i.e., sets of atomic formulas, comma denotes union of
such sets, and the following conditions are met:
(i) n  1;
(ii) σ = mgu(A1 .= A′1, . . . , An .= A′n);
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(iii) for every i, 1  i  n, sel(Ai ⇐ Bi ) = ∅ and Ai is maximal in Ai ⇐ Bi with
respect to ;
(iv) letting C be A ⇐ B, A′1, . . . , A′n, sel(C) = {−A′1, . . . ,−A′n} /= ∅, or sel(C) = ∅
and A′1, . . . , A′n are maximal in C with respect to .
This rule is sound, i.e., every conclusion is a consequence of the premises; in particular,
if the empty clause ⊥ is derivable from a given set of clauses S, then S is unsatisfiable. It
is also complete: if S is unsatisfiable, then one can derive ⊥ from S in finitely many steps
of ordered resolution with selection.
It is folklore that soundness and completeness still hold when terms are taken modulo
some equational theory E, provided σ is taken to be any member of a complete set of
unifiers (csu) csu(A1 .= A′1, . . . , An .= A′n) in condition (ii), and  is compatible with E,
meaning that if s1, s2 are equal mod E, if t1, t2 are equal mod E, and s1  t1 then s2  t2.
This was already the case for other refinements of resolution [35]. Such a csu always exists,
but needs not be finite or even computable. One can compute a finite one for the theory of
associativity and commutativity (AC), resp. with unit (ACU) [42,16].
Independently of equational reasoning, soundness and completeness are preserved when
tautologies and various forms of subsumed clauses are removed, at any moment (preferably
at the earliest) [2]. More importantly for making resolution terminate, we shall use rules of
splitting. A clause of the form C ∨ C′, where C and C′ are non-empty clauses that share
no free variable, is called splittable. Given a set of clauses S ∪ {C ∨ C′}, where C ∨ C′ is
splittable, the standard version of splitting [48] then consists of showing that both S ∪ {C}
and S ∪ {C′} are unsatisfiable to conclude that S ∪ {C ∨ C′} is. Each resulting clause set is
called a branch. (Resolution with splitting is then indeed a form of tableaux.) For example,
consider the following set of clauses:
(a) P (f (x, y)) ⇐ P1(x), P2(y) (b) Q1(x) ⇐ P(f (x, y)),Q2(y)
(c) P2(g(g(y))) ⇐ P2(y) (d) P2(g(a))
(e) Q2(g(g(g(y)))) ⇐ Q2(y) (f ) Q2(g(g(a)))
(g) ⊥ ⇐ Q1(g(a)) (h) P1(g(x))
When the two clauses (a) and (b) are resolved on P(f (x, y)), we generate the clause
Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x), P2(y),Q2(y), which is a splittable disjunction. The current branch then
splits in two branches, on which reasoning proceeds independently:
(i) Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x), P2(y),Q2(y) by (a), (b)
(j) Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x) (k) ⊥ ⇐ P2(y),Q2(y)
(l) ⊥ ⇐ P1(g(a)) by (j), (g) (m) ⊥ ⇐ P2(y),Q2(g(g(y)) by (k), (c)
⊥ by (l), (h) (n) ⊥ ⇐ P2(g(y)),Q2(y) by (m), (e)
(o) ⊥ ⇐ P2(y),Q2(g(y)) by (n), (c)
(p) ⊥ ⇐ Q2(g(g(a)) by (o), (d)
(q) ⊥ by (p), (f )
Splitting may be applied at any time without breaking soundness or completeness. Be-
cause this makes our proofs slightly easier, we shall use Riazanov and Voronkov’s special
brand of splitting [36,46]. We make it precise below, and call it splittingless splitting to
distinguish it from ordinary splitting. The idea is that when C ∨ C′ is splittable, then it is
equivalent to ∃q · (q ⇒ C) ∧ (¬q ⇒ C′), where q is a fresh propositional symbol.
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We make this formal as follows [38,24]. We first define formally what it means to create
fresh propositional symbols. Fix a set P of predicate symbols. A P-clause is any clause
whose predicate symbols are all from P. These will be our ordinary clauses. Let then Q
be some set of zero-ary predicate symbols disjoint from P, in one-to-one correspondence
with the set of P-clauses modulo renaming: for each P-clause C, let C be a symbol
in Q, so that C = C′ iff there is a renaming  such that C = C′. These will be our
fresh symbols; however notice that we allow ourselves to reuse the same symbol q = C′
when we meet the same clause C′ twice. The rule of splittingless splitting is shown below,
where C and C′ are two non-empty subclauses sharing no variable, where C′ is restricted
to be a P-clause, and C is required to contain at least an atom P(t) with P ∈ P.
C ∨ C′
C ∨ −C′
+C′ ∨ C′
The effect of the rule is to replace C ∨ C′ by the two clauses C ∨ −C′ and +C′ ∨
C′ in conclusion. Intuitively, C′ is a propositional symbol that abbreviates the negation
of C′, i.e., that is false exactly when C′ is valid. For example, the clause set (a)–(h) above
generates the following clauses, when using resolution and splittingless splitting:
(i)Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x), P2(y),Q2(y)by (a), (b)
(j ′) Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x), q
(k′) q ⇐ P2(y),Q2(y)
(m′) q ⇐ P2(y),Q2(g(g(y))) by (k′), (c)
(n′) q ⇐ P2(g(y)),Q2(y) by (m′), (e)
(o′) q ⇐ P2(y),Q2(g(y)) by (n′), (c)
(p′) q ⇐ Q2(g(g(a))) by (o′), (d)
(q ′) q by (p′), (f )
(j ′′) Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x) by (q ′), (j ′)
(l′) ⊥ ⇐ P1(g(a)) by (j ′′), (g)
& ⊥ by (l′), (h)
where q = ⊥ ⇐ P2(y),Q2(y). Note that steps (k′)–(q ′) simulate exactly the right
branch (k)–(q) of the tableau presented above, and the steps following (j ′′) simulate the
left branch (as claimed by [46]).
Ordered resolution with selection, using E-unification, is sound and complete, even
when splittingless splitting is applied eagerly (i.e., when both rules can be applied, apply
splittingless splitting), provided  is a stable ordering such that P(t)  q for every P ∈ P,
q ∈ Q. (We say that  is admissible.)
Proofs are omitted because these results can hardly be doubted, and for lack of space.
See [24] for a proof in the non-equational case (when E is the empty theory), and [38] for
a proof in a more general case, including all equational theories.
In the sequel, we shall always use a special form of splittingless splitting, which we call
-splitting: this is the special case where C′ is a negative block −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pn(x)
(n  1; the variable x is the same in each literal), and where C ∨ C′ is Horn. This is
the brand of splitting we used in the example above. The -splitting rule can be reex-
plained as the one that replaces any clause A ⇐ B, P1(x), . . . , Pn(x), where x is not
free in A or B, by the two clauses A ⇐ B, q and q ⇐ P1(x), . . . , Pn(x), where q =
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−P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pn(x); in effect, this defines q as being true if and only if there is a
term satisfying all of P1, . . . , Pn in the least Herbrand model (if any exists).
3. Diffie–Hellman-like protocols
3.1. The IKA.1 protocol
Consider the initial key agreement protocol IKA.1 [41] (formerly known as GDH.2),
used to create an initial group key in the CLIQUES protocol suite. The goal is for a group
of principals M1, . . . , Mk to obtain a common key that they can use for further commu-
nication. This key should be unavailable to external eavesdroppers. (An eavesdropper is an
intruder who may only listen to communication channels, but not forge messages, remove
messages or redirect channels.) Moreover, no principal should be able to decide the value
of the key for the others; in general, no proper subset of the principals should be able to
collude to create the common key.
We study the IKA.1 protocol in particular because it has attracted some attention re-
cently. IKA.1 is based on a Diffie–Hellman scheme [14], which works as follows. We take
the standpoint of a Dolev–Yao-like model [15], where terms—here, modulo AC—are used
to denote messages. As in Section 1, let e be a unary function symbol, and ⊕ a binary, as-
sociative and commutative symbol, and let 0 be a constant. Technically, we should impose
that 0 is a unit for ⊕, but our techniques to come would not adapt right away; we shall get
around this by using the Meadows trick, partially. Let also cons be a binary function, and
nil be a constant, used to represent lists. We shall also use other constants, to be introduced
later. We abbreviate cons(M1, cons(M2, . . . , cons(Mn, nil) . . .)) as M1;M2; . . . ;Mn. For
simplicity, assume we have three members in the group, M1, M2, M3.
First, IKA.1 starts with a so-called upflow phase: M1 sends M2 the message e(N1),
where N1 is a fresh nonce; N1 is modeled, as usual [32], as a new constant. Then M2
sends e(N2); e(N1); e(N1 ⊕ N2) to M3, where N2 is another fresh nonce (modeled as
another new constant N2 /= N1). This is possible due to our assumptions that anybody can
build e(M) from M and e(M ⊕ M ′) from e(M) and M ′.
Once this is done, M3 starts the downflow phase, and broadcasts e(N2 ⊕ N3); e(N1 ⊕
N3), from which all members can compute the group key e(N1 ⊕ N2 ⊕ N3). (N3 is a third
fresh nonce created by M3.)
We shall assume in the following discussion that each participant Mi (i  2) checks
whether the list of messages it got from Mi−1 in the upflow phase contains the trivial
message e(0), and if so, refuses to proceed. Otherwise,M2 could be caught receiving e(0)
just to send back e(N2); e(0); e(0 ⊕ N2), that is, e(N2); e(0); e(N2) modulo ACU. If this
were possible, then the protocol would fail, since N1 would be lost in the process, hence
the group key would be computed independently of N1. This is a perfectly reasonable
assumption in practice: any serious implementation of IKA.1 will include similar checks.
This will also allow us to use clauses modulo AC instead of modulo ACU.
3.2. Modeling IKA.1 with a fixed number of sessions
All possible interleaved executions of the protocol can be described using Horn clauses
modulo AC. Let us write selected clauses from this set.
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To model communication, introduce predicates chC for each configuration C that is
reachable in an interleaved run ofM1,M2,M3. Here a configuration is a triple of numbers,
each one stating which step of the protocol the corresponding principal was stationed at.
The formula chC(M) is meant to hold if and only if M is a possible message present on
some communication channel when in configuration C. We also create distinct predicates
IC such that IC(M) is meant to hold when M is deducible, in a sense inspired by Dolev
and Yao [15], from all messages present on the communication channels at or before
configuration C.
As such, for every reachable configuration C, we generate the clauses:
IC(0) (Intruder knows 0) (1)
IC(e(x)) ⇐ IC(x) (Intruder can (2)
IC(e(x ⊕ y)) ⇐ IC(e(x)), IC(y) exponentiate) (3)
IC(nil) (Intruder knows the empty list) (4)
IC(cons(x, y)) ⇐ IC(x), IC(y) (Intruder can build lists) (5)
IC(x) ⇐ IC(cons(x, y)) (Intruder can read heads) (6)
IC(y) ⇐ IC(cons(x, y)) (Intruder can read tails) (7)
We shall define several intrusion models. This will have an impact on the clauses we
shall generate to define chC . Whatever the model, we shall generate the clauses
IC(x) ⇐ chC(x) (Intruder spies on every channel) (8)
IC(x) ⇐ IC′(x) (Intruder remembers past messages) (9)
for any reachable configuration C, and where C′ is the predecessor of C (if any) in (9).
The most benign model from a security viewpoint is the pure eavesdropper model,
where the intruder does not interfere with communication, except for remembering all mes-
sages exchanged by the honest principals Mi . If Mi sends M under some conditions B,
then we generate the clause chC(M) ⇐ B. IfMi waits for some message M to be read be-
fore doing some action described by a clause A ⇐ B, then we generate A ⇐ B, chC(M).
(This will be described in more detail below.) In the pure eavesdropper model, this will be
all.
In the copycat model, the intruder is also able to replay old messages, and to divert
communication channels. We generate the additional clause
chC(x) ⇐ chC′(x) (10)
for any reachable configuration C with predecessor C′. This specifies that every message
put on some channel remains on this channel, and can be read at any time in the future, and
replayed as many times as we wish.
In the Dolev–Yao model, so named because it is closest to that of [15], instead of (10),
we generate the clause
chC(x) ⇐ IC(x) (Intruder has complete control over channels) (11)
In other words, anything read from any channel is directly forged by the intruder from
past messages. As far as security is concerned, this is the model giving the most abilities
to the intruder. Any attack in all previous models can be played in this model.
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The final required ingredient is the specification of the contents of the communication
channels in the initial configuration C0: we assume that some predicate chC0 has been
defined by some set of Horn clauses. We further restrict the pure eavesdropper model to be
such that the channel is empty in configuration C0: just do not produce any clause defining
chC0 .
Starting from C0, execution may proceed by lettingM1 send its upflow message toM2,
letting the whole system progress to some new configuration C1 (and C0 is its predecessor):
chC1(e(N1)) (Intruder gets M′1s message) (12)
Note that chC1 holds of exactly one message in the pure eavesdropper model. This will
be an invariant of our description: for any reachable configuration C, there will be at most
one ground term M such that chC(M) holds—the contents of the channel. In the copycat
and Dolev–Yao models, chC(M) may be true for several messages M , because of clauses
(10), resp. (11).
Let us write what happens if M2 runs next, sending its own message to M3:
chC2(e(N2); e(x); e(x ⊕ N2)) ⇐ chC1(e(x)) (13)
Clause (13) means that M2 reads the message from M1 first; this should be e(N1),
but M2 can only check that it is e(x) for some x; also, the only way it can get e(x) is
by querying the channel through chC1 . Then M2 should build e(N2); e(N1); e(N1 ⊕ N2).
Since the variable x should contain N1, actual implementations build e(N2); e(x); e(x ⊕
N2), and send it to the intruder in the new configuration C2. (Note that this clause does not
represent the case where the x received is 0; in this case, we should either switch to the
theory ACU, or generate the additional clause chC2(e(N2); e(0); e(N2)) ⇐ chC1(e(x)). As
we said earlier, we assume that the implementation checks that x is not 0, which dispenses
us from doing either.)
The downflow message from M3 gives rise to the clause:
chC3(e(x ⊕ N3); e(y ⊕ N3)) ⇐ chC2(e(x); e(y); e(z)) (14)
Now the secrecy requirement on, say, M′1s view of the group key is that
⊥ ⇐ chC3(cons(e(x), z′)), IC3(e(x ⊕ N1)) (15)
Indeed, M′1s view of the group key is e(x ⊕ N1), where the message broadcasted by M3
is cons(e(x), z′), i.e., where chC3(cons(e(x), z′)) holds (reminder: if this message is not
forged, then x = N2 ⊕ N3). Clause (15) states that this view e(x ⊕ N1) is not known to
the intruder in configuration C3 (and therefore neither in C1 or C2).
There are many other possible interleavings, whose description we leave to the reader.
The important point is that, if there is an attack, then the resulting set of clauses S0 will be
unsatisfiable: an attack will provide a derivation of ⊥. Hence, if S0 is satisfiable, then the
protocol is secure. This observation is due to Selinger [40] in the non-equational case.
3.3. Transformations of clauses
It will be useful in the sequel to work on restricted forms of clauses. The main reason is that
the satisfiability of general clause formats is undecidable, but some transformations
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can be used to convert clauses to a decidable format, possibly losing some information. The
prototype of this is given by Frühwirth et al. [18]. We describe a very similar transformation,
inspired from Goubault-Larrecq [22].
The main transformation we use is flattening. The purpose of flattening is to transform
the input clause set S0 into a set of so-called flat clauses S1, in which all predicate symbols
are applied either to variables or to flat terms f (x1, . . . , xn), where f is a function symbol
and x1, . . . , xn are variables.
Let S be a set of clauses. If there is a clause C = C0 ∨ ±P(t) in S where t is neither a
variable nor a flat term, i.e., t = f (t1, . . . , tn), then:
1. If ± is −, create n fresh predicate symbols Pj , 1  j  n, and replace C in S by the
n + 1 clauses:
C0 ∨ −P1(t1) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pn(tn) (16)
−P(f (X1, . . . , Xn)) ∨ +Pj (Xj ) (1  j  n) (17)
where X1, . . . , Xn are fresh variables, not necessarily distinct, but such that ti /= tj
implies Xi /= Xj , 1  i  j  n;
2. If ± is +, create n fresh predicate symbols Pj , 1  j  n, and replace C in S by the
n + 1 clauses:
+P(f (X1, . . . , Xn)) ∨ −P1(X1) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pn(Xn) (18)
C0 ∨ +Pj (tj ) (1  j  n) (19)
Write SS′ if S′ is obtained by such a transformation. It is easy to see that  ter-
minates: let |t | be the size of term t , i.e., |x| = 0 for every variable x, |f (t1, . . . , tn)| =
1 + |t1| + · · · + |tn|, and the size of the clause ±1P1(t1) ∨ · · · ∨ ±nPn(tn) be ∑ni=1 |ti |,
then these rules replace at least one clause by clauses of lower sizes.
Furthermore, every normal form is a set of flat clauses. Moreover, if SS′, then S′
logically implies S: just resolve (16) and (17), or (18) and (19) on the new atoms and
you get back C. So, if S′ is satisfiable, then so will be S. In particular, letting S1 be any
-normal form of S0, if S1 is satisfiable, then S0 will be too, and the protocol will be
secure. In general, the converse is wrong, so this is an abstraction. It turns out that, in
the case of the clauses of Section 3.2, this abstraction is exact in all three models (pure
eavesdropper, copycat, Dolev–Yao): see Section 3.4.
A slight optimization of flattening in the presence of an AC symbol ⊕ is to modify the
definition of flat terms so that any sum of variables x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn is considered a flat
term.
We may extend flattening so as to apply the transformation rules (1) and (2) above
even when t is of the form f (x1, . . . , xn) where x1, . . . , xn are variables, provided some
additional conditions are met. (Otherwise, the procedure would loop on clauses of the form
(17) and (19).)
One typical case is when the rest C0 of the clause contains another literal ±P ′(g(y1,
. . . , ym)) where the sequences (y1, . . . , ym) and (x1, . . . , xn) differ, or when f /= g. Nor-
malizing clauses with this relaxed definition of flattening ensures that the resulting clauses
are either blocks or complex clauses (in the sense of the following definition, and in the
terminology of Goubault-Larrecq [22]), or disjunctions of such clauses, not sharing any
free variable.
Definition 2 (Blocks, Complex Clauses). A block is any clause of the form ±1P1(x) ∨
· · · ∨ ±nPn(x), for the same variable x. We abbreviate such blocks B(x).
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A complex clause is any clause of the form
∨m
i=1 ±iPi(f (x1, . . . , xn)) ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨
Bn(xn), where B1, . . . , Bn are blocks and m  1 (with the same f and the same sequence
of variables x1, . . . , xn as arguments of f ).
For the sake of simplicity, we note both B(x) for the disjunction of negative literals and
for the conjunction of literals in the right-hand of ⇐ in a clause.
Blocks and complex clauses correspond exactly to a class of positive set constraints,
with equality constraints between brothers, when reasoning modulo the empty theory;
Goubault-Larrecq [22] uses this observation to generalize positive set constraints to higher-
order terms. That set constraints correspond to a decidable class of first-order formulas,
namely the monadic class, was observed by Bachmair et al. [3].
Define an automata clause to be a Horn clause which is either a block or a complex clause.
More generally, in the presence of an AC symbol ⊕, we let an AC-automata clause be a Horn
clause which is either a block, or a complex clause involving a non-equational symbol (other
that ⊕), or a clause with only ⊕ as function symbol (these are called ⊕-clauses). We will
simply call it an automata clause when it is clear that we are working modulo the theory AC.
Flattening of Horn clauses produces only automata clauses. These are also, upto small vari-
ations (to be precise, generalizations of), the alternating two-way tree automata clauses of
Verma [45,44]. For example the block P1(x) ⇐ P2(x), P3(x) is an alternation clause in [45,
44]. The complex clauses P1(f (x, y)) ⇐ P2(x), P3(y) and P1(x) ⇐ P2(f (x, y)), P3(x),
P4(y)are pop and general push clauses. The clauseP1(f (x, y)) ⇐ P2(f (x, y)), P3(x) is not
allowed in Verma [45,44], but is an automata clause in this paper. Allowing the AC symbol ⊕
also in place of f in the pop and general push clauses leads to undecidability [45,44]. How-
ever dropping alternation and suitably restricting the general push clauses allows one to re-
gain decidability, with non-primitive recursive complexity in the AC case [43]. One notable
restriction is that the general push clauses involving the ⊕ symbol have to be of the form
P1(x) ⇐ P2(x ⊕ y). Further, disallowing general push clauses involving the⊕ symbol gives
us an elementary complexity [45]. Our method in this paper is able to deal with all these
clauses and more. We use automata clauses in this paper simply because these are the cases
on which the techniques of Section 4 work.
3.4. Flattening the IKA.1 clauses
All clauses of Section 3.2 but a few are automata clauses. E.g., clauses (1), (2), (4)–(11)
are automata clauses.
The remaining ones can be rewritten in the form of automata clauses by introducing
auxiliary predicate symbols, that is, by flattening. Clause (3) is flattened to:
QC(x) ⇐ IC(e(x)) Q′C(x ⊕ y) ⇐ QC(x), IC(y) IC(e(z)) ⇐ Q′C(z)
where QC and Q′C are fresh. Note that we do not lose any information here: the clauses
above state exactly the same thing as IC(e(x ⊕ y)) ⇐ IC(e(x)), IC(y), provided we define
QC so that QC holds of every term t such that IC(e(t)) holds, and Q′C holds of every sum
of terms t and t ′ such that t satisfies QC and t ′ satisfies IC .
A similar observation holds of clauses (12) and (15). We can flatten the latter as
R(z) ⇐ chC3(cons(z, z′)) R′(z′) ⇐ chC3(cons(z, z′)) R′′(y) ⇐ IC3(e(y))
R′′′(x) ⇐ R(e(x)) R′′′′(x) ⇐ R′′(x + N1) ⊥ ⇐ R′′′(x), R′′′′(x), R′(z′)
where R, R′, R′′, R′′′, R′′′′ are fresh. There are other flattenings, in the sense that we may re-
trieve (15) by resolution from other sets of clauses. Note that this flattening avoids generating
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so-called intersection (a.k.a., alternation) clauses, of the form P(x) ⇐ Q(x),Q′(x). This
would be important if we were to use Verma’s [43] techniques, as this shows that we do not
need alternation, a cause of undecidability, for this clause.
The only clauses where flattening is approximate are (13) and (14). The clauses
valx(x) ⇐ chC1(e(x)) chC2(x1; x2; x3) ⇐ P1(x1), P2(x2), P3(x3)
P1(e(N2)) P2(e(x)) ⇐ valx(x) P3(e(x ⊕ N2)) ⇐ valx(x)
are equivalent to (13) in the Dolev–Yao model, in the copycat model (where sending lists
of elements or sending each element separately has the same net effect) and in the pure
eavesdropper model (where any chC recognizes at most one value anyway). These can be
converted to automata clauses:
valx(x) ⇐ chC1(e(x))
chC2(cons(x1, y)) ⇐ P1(x1), ch1C2(y) ch1C2(cons(x2, y)) ⇐ P2(x2), ch2C2(y)
ch2C2(cons(x3, y)) ⇐ P3(x3), ch3C2(y) ch3C2(nil)
P1(e(x)) ⇐ P 11 (x) P 11 (N2)
P2(e(x)) ⇐ valx(x)
P3(e(x)) ⇐ P 13 (x) P 13 (x ⊕ N2) ⇐ valx(x)
where all newly introduced predicates are fresh. By a similar argument clause (14) can be
converted to automata clauses:
P ′1(x1) ⇐ chC2(cons(x1, z1)) P ′2(z1) ⇐ chC2(cons(x1, z1)) P ′5(nil)
P ′3(y1) ⇐ P ′2(cons(y1, z1)) P ′4(e(x ⊕ N3)) ⇐ P ′1(e(x)) P ′6(e(y ⊕ N3)) ⇐ P ′3(e(y))
P ′7(cons(z, z′)) ⇐ P ′′6 (z), P ′5(z′) chC3(cons(x′, y′)) ⇐ P ′4(x′), P ′7(y′)
Apart from giving an illustration of flattening, this section is meant to show that the IKA.1
protocol with finitely many principals can be encoded exactly in the decidable fragment of
sets of automata clauses modulo AC without alternation. While we would not make any
use of this observation here, since we rely on approximate techniques anyway, it may be
useful in further exact treatments of IKA.1.
4. Deciding sets of automata clauses modulo AC with resolution
4.1. Preliminaries: Deciding the non-equational case by resolution
To decide sets of automata clauses, we use ordered resolution with selection, eager -
splitting, and elimination of tautologies and forward subsumed clauses. To see why this
is interesting, let us explain why this strategy decides the satisfiability of any finite set
of automata clauses modulo the empty theory; we shall deal with the AC case later. Note
that this satisfiability problem is exactly the satisfiability problem of definite positive set
constraints with equality tests between brothers, see [22] for details. (The more general
case of non-definite positive set constraints, i.e., the case of possibly non-Horn flattened
clauses can also be handled this way.)
Choose the ordering  so that P(t)  q for every P ∈ P and q ∈ Q, and P(t)  P ′(t ′)
whenever t is a strict superterm of t ′, whatever P, P ′ ∈ P are. This is a stable ordering,
hence an admissible ordering, so ordered resolution with selection is sound and complete
if we use this ordering.
To make resolution terminate, define the selection function sel0 as follows:
• if C contains a negative literal −q with q ∈ Q, then sel0(C) = {−q};
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• otherwise, let max(C) be the set of maximal literals in C for , then define sel0(C) as
the subset of those negative literals in max(C).
For example, in clause (a) in the example of Section 2.2, namely P(f (x, y)) ⇐ P1(x),
P2(y), there is no negative literal −q, so apply the second item. The only maximal literal
is +P(f (x, y)), and it is positive. So no literal is selected in this clause. By condition (iii)
of Definition 1, this clause can be used as side premise; by condition (iv), it cannot be used
as main premise. In clause (b) Q1(x) ⇐ P(f (x, y)),Q2(y), the only selected literal is
−P(f (x, y)). Clause (b) can therefore be used as main premise but not as side premise.
So ordered resolution with selection can be used in only one way on clauses (a) and (b),
yielding clause (i) Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x), P2(y),Q2(y). This clause can be -split immediately,
yielding clauses (j ′) Q1(x) ⇐ P1(x), q and (k′) q ⇐ P2(y),Q2(y). Notice that, up to the
addition of q literals, the resulting clauses are still automata clauses.
More formally, let Q0 be the set of all q literals of the form B(x), where B(x) is any
non-empty negative block. Since B(x) is a block, it is aP-clause. IfP contains p predicate
symbols, then Q0 contains 2p − 1 elements.
We claim that, given any finite set S of automataP-clauses (modulo the empty theory),
i.e., of automata clauses which are also P-clauses, every clause obtained from S by the
above resolution strategy is Horn and of one of the following forms:
(1) a clause C[∨ + q], where C is a block and q ∈ Q0 (the notation C[∨ + q] meaning a
clause of the form C or C ∨ +q);
(2) a clause C[∨ + q], where C is a complex P-clause, and q ∈ Q0;
(3) or a clause C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm[∨ + q], where C is a block, q1, . . . , qm, q ∈ Q0 and
1  m  a, and a is the maximal arity of all function symbols;
Indeed:
• Resolvents of clauses of type (1) are again of type (1).
• Any ordered resolution step with selection between clauses of type (2) must have as
premises clauses of the form C ∨ +P(f (x1, . . . , xm)) and C′ ∨ −P(f (x1, . . . , xm))
[∨ + q] (where ±P(f (x1, . . . , xm)) is maximal in both), yielding C ∨ C′[∨ + q];
either the latter is of type (2) again if there is another literal ±Q(f ′(x1, . . . , xm)) in
C or in C′, or C ∨ C′ is a disjunction B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bm(xm) of m blocks, as in the
example of clauses (a) and (b) above; in the latter case, note that since C ∨ C′ is Horn,
at most one block Bi(xi) is non-negative: repeated -splitting then produces the clauses
+Bj (xj ) ∨ Bj (xj ) (which are of type (1)), for all j /= i such that Bj (xj ) /= ⊥, and
the clause Bi(xi) ∨ ∨j /=i,Bj (xj ) /=⊥ −Bj (xj )[∨ + q] (which is of type (3)).• Any ordered resolution step with selection between a clause of type (1) and a clause
of type (2) must be between clauses of the form C ∨ −P(x)[∨ + q] (type (1)) and
C′ ∨ +P(f (x1, . . . , xm)) (type (2)), or between clauses C ∨ +P(x) (type (1)) and C′ ∨
−P(f (x1, . . . , xm))[∨ + q] (type (2)), yielding C[x := f (x1, . . . , xm)] ∨ C′[∨ + q]
in both cases. This is of type (2) if C is non-empty or there is a literal ±Q(f ′(x1, . . . ,
xm)) in C′; otherwise, this is a disjunction of m blocks (possibly with +q), yielding
clauses of type (1) and (3) by -splitting, as in the previous case.
• Next, the only way we can resolve a type (3) clause with some other clause is to resolve
on one of the selected literals −qi , 1  i  m; this can only be done with a clause C
containing +qi , but this is impossible if C is of type (1) or (2) since qi is not maximal
in C, unless C is exactly the unit clause +qi , in which case the resolvent is of type (3)
or (1); and this is impossible when C is of type (3), since then sel0(C) /= ∅.
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This entails the well-known result:
Theorem 3. The satisfiability of definite positive set constraints with equality tests between
brothers, a.k.a., the satisfiability of sets of automata clauses (modulo the empty theory), is
DEXPTIME-complete.
Proof. Let p the number of predicates, f the number of function symbols, a the maximum
arity of function symbols in the initial set of automata clauses. Remember there are at
most 2p elements in Q0. So there are at most 4p(2p + 1) type (1) clauses, f 4p+pa(2p +
1) type (2) clauses, and 4p(2p + 1).∑am=1
(
2p
m
)
type (3) clauses. Since ∑am=1
(
2p
m
)

∑a
m=1 2pm = 2p(2pa − 1)/(2p − 1), there are at most 4p(2p + 1)2p(2pa − 1)/(2p − 1)
type (3) clauses. The number of generated clauses is then exponential. Since generating
them and removing renamed versions of clauses can be done in polynomial time in the size
of clauses, and clauses are of at most polynomial size in p, f , a (remember that m  a
in type (3) clauses), the resolution strategy above terminates in exponential time. This is
easily seen to be optimal, since the problem trivially includes the emptiness problem for
intersections of tree automata [39]. 
4.2. Why the AC case is harder
Unfortunately, resolving two clauses that use some AC symbol ⊕ generates bigger
clauses in general, in such a way that we cannot bound their size.
In particular, imitating the argument of Section 4.1 by trying, say, to restrict to blocks
and complex clauses (letting f1, . . . , fn be any function symbols, including AC symbols),
fails. Consider for example the following clauses
P(x′) ⇐ Q′C(x′ ⊕ y′) Q′C(x ⊕ y) ⇐ QC(x), IC(y)
(We have already obtained the second clause by expanding clause (3) in Section 3.4.)
One complete set of AC-unifiers of x′ ⊕ y′ and x ⊕ y consists of the following seven
substitutions, where x1, x2, y1, y2 are fresh, pairwise distinct variables:
(1) [x := x1 ⊕ y1, y := x2 ⊕ y2, x′ := x1 ⊕ x2, y′ := y1 ⊕ y2]
(2) [y := x′ ⊕ y2, y′ := x ⊕ y2] (3) [y := y′ ⊕ x2, x′ := x ⊕ x2]
(4) [x := x′ ⊕ y1, y′ := y ⊕ y1] (5) [x := y′ ⊕ x1, x′ := y ⊕ x1]
(6) [x′ := y, y′ := x] (7) [x′ := x, y′ := y]
We then get the following seven resolvents:
(1) P (x1 ⊕ x2) ⇐ QC(x1 ⊕ y1), IC(x2 ⊕ y2)
(2) P (x′) ⇐ QC(x), IC(x′ ⊕ y2) (3) P (x ⊕ x2) ⇐ QC(x), IC(y′ ⊕ x2)
(4) P (x′) ⇐ QC(x′ ⊕ y1), IC(y) (5) P (y ⊕ x1) ⇐ QC(y′ ⊕ x1), IC(y)
(6) P (y) ⇐ QC(x), IC(y) (7) P (x) ⇐ QC(x), IC(y)
Clauses (2), (4), (6), and (7) split further, yielding
P(x′) ⇐ IC(x′ ⊕ y2), q1 q1 ⇐ QC(x) P (y) ⇐ IC(y), q1
P(x′) ⇐ QC(x′ ⊕ y1), q2 q2 ⇐ IC(y) P (x) ⇐ QC(x), q2
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respectively using -splitting, where q1 = −QC(x), q2 = −IC(y). However, clauses
(1), (3), and (5) are neither blocks nor complex clauses, because they contain literals
whose sets of free variables do not contain all the free variables of the clause; this was
an essential condition for decidability in the non-AC case of Section 4.1. It is probably
futile to try to allow for more general complex clauses, until we reach a notion that is
general enough; resolving these clauses with other clauses only produces larger and larger
resolvents, involving larger and larger sums of variables.
4.3. Grey zones, grey oracles
Instead, our action plan is as follows. Imagine for the moment that we are using just
resolution to decide the satisfiability of automata clauses, modulo AC. Then any proof is
a tree whose nodes are labeled by clauses; if resolution is applied to the side premises C1,
. . . , Cn and the main premise C, with conclusion C′, then C′ will label a node whose sons
are labeled with C1, . . . , Cn, C. Splitting would complicate matters quite a lot here. If
we overlook the problem with splitting for the moment, and if we ignore the necessity of
using q literals, the arguments of Section 4.1 show that, as long as we deal with blocks and
complex clauses with only non-equational function symbols only finitely many clauses,
either blocks or similar complex clauses, can be produced. As soon as ⊕ comes into play,
we may get larger and larger ⊕-clauses, see Section 4.2. But, if such clauses eventually
participate in deriving the empty clause, it must be the case that one ⊕-clause thus derived
eventually resolves with other clauses to get a conclusion C that is either directly the empty
clause, or can resolve with complex clauses not containing ⊕. Since no term headed by ⊕
unifies with a term headed by f , with f /= ⊕, and provided we only unify on maximal
atoms, C can only be a disjunction of literals of the form ±P(x), with x a variable. Hence
C must split into blocks.
This is tentatively pictured in Fig. 1; the leaves of the derivation (at the top) are clauses
in the initial clause set S. Resolution steps inside the white zones are those that we met
in Section 4.1, and which must terminate since they only generate finitely many clauses.
Resolution steps inside the grey zones produce arbitrarily many, arbitrarily large ⊕-clauses.
This leads us to the following idea: instead of applying resolution inside the grey zones, try
to guess the fat dots, which are the interface points between grey zones and white zones.
Forbid resolution to act on ⊕-clauses (this prevents us from using resolution to derive
clauses inside the grey zones), and compensate this by adding a rule that infers the fat dot
clauses, at the bottom of grey zones, directly from the clauses at the top of grey zones: this
is the oracle rule. At this point, we must admit that this does not seem practical at all; the
perspective will gradually improve. Let us only notice however that the fat dots, which are
splittable disjunctions of blocks, are only finitely many.
Let us just give the idea of a possible oracle. Inside a grey zone, we only have ⊕-
clauses. In particular, no symbol other than ⊕ occurs. So all deductions made inside a grey
zone are valid in any model of the sole associative–commutative symbol ⊕. E.g., consider
Z/nZ, where ⊕ denotes addition modulo n. We then compute all instances of clauses given
on entry to the grey zone inside the model; for example, the instances of P(x ⊕ y) ⇐
Q(x), R(y) in Z/2Z are P(0) ⇐ Q(0), R(0); P(1) ⇐ Q(0), R(1); P(1) ⇐ Q(1), R(0);
and P(0) ⇐ Q(1), R(1). We then let the oracle simulate resolution at the level of first-
order clauses by computing all resolvents on the instances over Z/nZ. From time to time,
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Fig. 1. Grey zones, fat dots, white zones.
we examine a given inferred instance, and guess which fat dot clause it might be an instance
of.
In the following sections, we make the intuition behind Fig. 1 formal. Indeed, while we
hope that the discussion above conveys the essential ideas, the arguments in this discussion
are slightly wrong, and certainly cannot serve as proof. This will require several careful
definitions, and gradual modifications to the basic ordered resolution with selection rule
before we can state the fundamental oracle lemma. (Please fasten your seat belts: this is
definitely technical. We have done our best to make it accessible.)
4.4. Scrutinizing the resolution rule
It is as easy (or as difficult) to deal with the special case of one ⊕ symbol as to deal with
many equational theories at once, so let us introduce the corresponding generalization.
Recall that a signature  is a set of function symbols, together with their arities. A -term,
or equivalently a term on  is any term whose function symbols are all taken from . We
say that aP-clause is a -clause if and only if it is of the form ±1P1(t1) ∨ · · · ∨ ±kPk(tk)
where t1, . . . , tk are -terms. It is a non-trivial -clause if and only if, additionally, not
all of t1, . . . , tk are variables. Similarly, an equation s ≈ t is on  if and only if s and t
are both on . (We use the symbol ≈ for equations to distinguish it from true equality; we
assume that s ≈ t and t ≈ s are the same equation.) An equational theory on  is a set E
of equations on . The notion of an equality s ≈ t provable from E, written E |= s ≈ t
is defined as usual, inductively, by the rules E |= s ≈ s (reflexivity), E |= s ≈ t implies
E |= t ≈ s (symmetry), E |= s ≈ t and E |= t ≈ u imply E |= s ≈ u (transitivity), E |=
sσ ≈ tσ if (s ≈ t) ∈ E for any substitution σ (even mapping variables to terms that are
not on , but on a larger signature), and E |= si ≈ ti , 1  i  n, together imply E |=
f (s1, . . . , sn) ≈ f (t1, . . . , tn) (congruence). For example, let AC be the theory {x ⊕ y ≈
y ⊕ x, (x ⊕ y) ⊕ z ≈ x ⊕ (y ⊕ z)} of associativity and commutativity of ⊕, a theory on
the signature {⊕}, then AC |= f (a) ⊕ ((b ⊕ c) ⊕ f (c)) ≈ (b ⊕ c) ⊕ (f (a) ⊕ f (c)).
We say that an equational theory E on  is simple if and only if there is a computable
strict, stable ordering E, closed under context applications and compatible with E, such
that f (x1, . . . , xn) E, xi for every i, 1  i  n, and every function symbol f (possibly
outside ), where x1, . . . , xn are distinct variables. In other words, E, is a computable,
compatible simplification ordering. AC and the empty theory are simple: take E, to be
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defined by s E, t if and only if |s| > |t | and every variable occurs at least as many times
in s as in t , where |u| denotes the size of term u. ACU = AC ∪ {x ⊕ 0 ≈ x} is not simple.
Note that, assuming there is at least one non-constant function symbol f , any simple
equational theory E must be collapse-free, i.e., if E |= s ≈ t , then either s and t are the
same variable x, or neither s nor t is a variable. Indeed, assume otherwise: E |= s ≈ x,
where x is a variable and s is not. If x is free in s, then s E, x by simplicity, hence
s E,X s by compatibility, which is impossible. If x is not free in s, then E |= s[x :=
f (x, . . . , x)] ≈ x[x := f (x, . . . , x)], so since x is not free in s, E |= s ≈ f (x, . . . , x);
since f is not constant, f (x, . . . , x) E, x, so s E, s by compatibility, a contradiction
again.
We shall claim that, given the right ordering and selection function, we can make res-
olution start from clauses of certain forms, and only generate clauses of the same forms.
These forms were the types (1), (2) and (3) in Section 4.1. Here we shall use more general
clauses.
Proposition 4. Let 0,  be two disjoint signatures, such that  ∪ 0 contains at least one
non-constant function symbol. Assume E is a simple equational theory on , and let E,
be any computable strict, stable ordering compatible with E such that f (x1, . . . , xn) E,
xi for every i, 1  i  n, for every f ∈  ∪ 0. Let sel be the following selection function:
• If C is a Horn -clause, possibly in disjunction with +q, q ∈ Q0, then:
◦ If C contains a negative literal −P(t) with t not a variable, then let sel(C) be
{−P(t)} (note that the fact that t is not a variable is well-defined modulo E, since
E is simple, hence collapse-free);
◦ Otherwise, if C can be written as A ⇐ B, P1(x), . . . , Pm(x) where x is not free
in A or in the body (i.e., conjunction of atoms) B and m  1 (in other words, if
there is a variable x free on the right of ⇐ but not on the left), then let sel(C) be
{−P1(x), . . . ,−Pm(x)}.
◦ Otherwise, sel(C) is empty.
• If C is a clause containing no function symbol from , then:
◦ if C contains a negative literal −q with q ∈ Q, then sel(C) = {−q};
◦ otherwise, let max(C) be the set of maximal literals in C for , then define sel(C)
as the subset of those negative literals in max(C).
For simplicity, say “resolution” for “ordered resolution with selection with ordering E,
and selection function sel”.
Given any set S of Horn clauses of one of the following types:
(4) C[∨ + q], where C is a block and q ∈ Q0;
(5) C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm[∨ + q], where C is a complex 0-clause, m  0, and q1,
. . . , qm, q ∈ Q0;
(6) C[∨ + q], where C is a non-trivial -clause, and q ∈ Q0.
Then any clause obtained from S by resolution, and by eager -splitting on clauses not of
type (6), is again of one of the types (4), (5), (6).
Note that we restrict -splitting so as to not split clauses of type (6). This is to avoid
problems in the treatment of splitting in -clauses.
Proof. First, observe that: (∗) no non-variable 0-term s = f (s1, . . . , sm) unifies with
any non-variable -term t modulo E. Indeed, assume otherwise: E |= sσ ≈ tσ for some
substitution σ . Any term equal to s modulo E is of the form f (. . .), with f ∈ 0, and since
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 is collapse-free, any term equal to tσ modulo E must be of the form g(. . .) with g ∈ .
We conclude by observing that f /= g, since  and 0 are disjoint.
The case of clauses of type (4) and (5) has already been dealt with in Section 4.1, using
the same selection function: clauses (4) and (5) resolve together to produce other clauses
of type (4) or (5) only, up to -splitting.
It remains to examine the case where one clause of type (6) is resolved against some
other clauses. There are two cases, depending on whether this clause is used as a main
clause or as a side clause. Let the main clause be C ∨ −A1 ∨ · · · ∨ −Am, where −A1, . . . ,
−Am are the literals resolved upon, and let the side clauses be A′i ⇐ Bi , 1  i  m.• Let us assume some side clause A′i ⇐ Bi is of type (6). Looking at the definition of
sel, and remembering that no literal can be selected in a side clause, we realize that
A′i ⇐ Bi must be of the form
+Pi(gi(ti1, . . . , timi )) ∨ Bi1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bin(xni )
with gi ∈ , and some negative blocks B1(x1), . . . , Bni (xni ), and where x1, . . . , xni are
free in gi(ti1, . . . , timi ).
This implies that the main clause cannot be of type (5). Assume the contrary. E,
and sel have been set up in such a way that the literals resolved upon, namely A1,
. . . , Am, would be maximal. Let Ai be written Pi(ti), with ti a 0-term. Observe that
ti cannot be a variable, say y: since C ∨ −A1 ∨ · · · ∨ −Am is of type (5), y would
occur free in some non-variable term of the clause, contradicting maximality. So ti is
a non-variable 0-term, hence Ai cannot unify with gi(ti1, . . . , timi ) modulo E, by (∗)
above.
So the main clause is of type (4) or (6).
We claim that no other side clause A′j ⇐ Bj , j /= i, can be of type (5). Indeed,
assume otherwise. Since no literal is selected in side clauses, by definition of sel any
side clause must contain no −q, q ∈ Q0, and the only maximal literal must be positive.
So, any type (5) side clause must be of the form
Pj (f (t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n′)) ⇐ Bj
where f ∈ 0. If the main clause is of type (4), then by definition of sel, the selected
literals A1, . . . , Am in it are of the form −P1(x), . . . , −Pm(x) with the same variable x,
so x unifies with both gi(ti1, . . . , timi ) (ith side clause) and f (t ′1, . . . , t ′n′) (j th), which
is impossible by (∗). If the main clause is of type (6), notice that sel was defined in
such a way that the only possibility that it selects two or more atoms (required for i and
j to be distinct) is in the second item of its definition, in which case the selected literals
A1, . . . , Am are of the form −P1(x), . . . , −Pm(x) with the same variable x, and the
same argument goes through.
Since the main clause and all side clauses are of type (4) or (6), it is clear now that the
resolvent is of type (6), if some symbol from  remains in it, or that it is a disjunction
of blocks (and possibly of some +q, q ∈ Q0), which -splits into clauses of type (4) or
(5).
• Let us assume now that the main clause C ∨ −A1 ∨ · · · ∨ −Am is of type (6), but no
side clause is. We have three cases, corresponding to the three cases defining sel:
◦ m = 1, A1 = P(t), t is not a variable. In particular, t is a term that does not unify with
any non-variable 0-term, by (∗). In particular the side clause A′1 ⇐ B1 must be such
that A′1 = P(x) for some variable x. Since no literal is selected in a side clause, B1
contains no q literal, and also no literal that is maximal in A′1 ⇐ B1.
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We then claim thatB1 must be empty. Among all literals inB1 where x is not free,
there must be a maximal one, say −Q(u). Now Q(u) and x must be incomparable
w.r.t. E,: indeed, if u E, x, since E, is stable and x is not free in u, we would
have u[x := u] E, x[x := u], i.e., u E, u, and similarly if x E, u. But then
Q(u) would be maximal in A′1 ⇐ B1, where A′1 = P(x), a contradiction. So all
literals in B1 must contain x free; but since E, is a simplification ordering, the
existence of such a literal inB1 contradicts the maximality of +P(x). SoB1 is empty.
So A′1 ⇐ B1 is just the clause +P(x), and the resolvent is C, which is of type (6) if
C still contains a symbol from , or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5) otherwise.
◦ A1 = P1(x), . . . , Am = Pm(x), and x is not free in C. Let σ be some member of
csu(A1
.= A′1, . . . , Am .= A′m), and write A′i as Pi(t ′i ), 1  i  m. Since σ unifies Ai
with A′i , it also unifies all the terms t ′i , 1  i  m.
If some t ′i is a non-variable -term, then none of the clauses A′j ⇐ Bj , 1  j  m,
can be of type (5). Indeed, by the definition of sel, the only case a clause A′j ⇐ Bj
of type (5) can be used as side clause (with no literal selected) is when A′j = Pj (t ′j )
is such that t ′j is non-variable (a fact we have already used earlier). But if t ′j is non-
variable, and is a 0-term (since A′j ⇐ Bj is of type (5)), then it cannot unify with t ′i ,
by (∗). Remember we have assumed that no side clause was of type (6). So, if some t ′i
is a non-variable -term, then all side clauses are of type (4), and by arguments similar
to the previous case (the case m = 1, A1 = P(t), t not a variable), the generated
resolvent is of type (6), or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5).
So we are left with the case where all side clauses are of type (4) or (5). Without loss
of generality, assume that the clauses of type (4) among the side clauses are A′i ⇐ Bi ,
1  i  k, and the clauses of type (5) are A′i ⇐ Bi , k + 1  i  m. Remember that
no literal is selected in A′i ⇐ Bi . When 1  i  k, A′i = Pi(y) for some variable y,
so by definition of sel,Bi must be empty. When k + 1  i  m, we use the fact that
A′i ⇐ Bi is an automata clause for the first time. This special case of an automata
clause with no literal selected must be of the form
Pi(f (xi1, . . . , xin)) ⇐ Bi1(xi1), . . . , Bin(xin)
where the variables xi1, . . . , xin are not necessarily distinct, and the B ′ij s are sets of
predicate symbols. The symbol f is the same for every i, because all A′is must unify.
In the trivial case where k = m, i.e., when all side clauses are of type (4), the
resolvent is of type (6) or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5). The interesting case
is when k < m. Then there is a unique most general unifier σ of x, y, and the terms
f (xi1, . . . , xin), k + 1  i  m, and σ maps variables to variables. The resolvent is(
C ∨ ∨mi=k+1
∨n
j=1 Bij (xij )
)
σ , which is of type (6) if any symbol from  remains,
or splits into clauses of type (4) and (5) otherwise.
◦ No literal is selected; by (iv), A1, . . . , Am are maximal in C ∨ −A1 ∨ · · · ∨ −Am.
More importantly, since no literal is selected in C ∨ −A1 ∨ · · · ∨ −Am, the definition
of sel implies that the only negative literals in this clause are of the form −P(x) with
x a variable free at the left of the ⇐ sign, i.e., that this clause is of the form
P(g(x1, . . . , xn)) ⇐ B1(x1), . . . , Bn(xn)
with g ∈ . But no negative literal is maximal here, contradiction. 
240 J. Goubault-Larrecq et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 64 (2005) 219–251
The proof of Proposition 4 shows that, starting from clauses of type (4), (5), or (6),
resolution can be decomposed into two subcases: white zone resolution, where the premises
are of type (4) or (5), and grey zone resolution, where at least one premise is of type (6).
The latter has two variants: light grey resolution is when there is just one other premise,
which is of type (4) or (6); dark grey resolution is the one occurring in the next-to-last case
of the proof of Proposition 4:
Pi(x) (1  i  k)
Pi(f (xi1, . . . , xin)) ⇐ Bi1(xi1), . . . , Bin(xin) C ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x)
(k + 1  i  m)
_______________________________________________________________(DGRes)(
C ∨ ∨mi=k+1
∨n
j=1 Bij (xij )
)
σ
where 0  k  m − 1, x is not free in C, C is of the form
P(g(y1, . . . , yk)) ⇐ B1(y1), . . . , Bk(yk), Bk+1(yk+1), . . . , B(y)
with g ∈ , and σ is the mgu of x and all f (xi1, . . . , xin), k + 1  i  m.
Moreover, as said above, the only places where we get out of the grey zone, i.e., where
we derive clauses that are not of type (6) by grey resolution, are when we generate split-
table disjunctions of blocks (possibly in disjunction with +q, q ∈ Q0), which get -split
immediately, yielding clauses of type (4) or (5).
Let us abstract whatever may happen inside the grey zone by a unique rule: starting
from a set S of clauses of type (4), (5) or (6), we guess which kind of clauses may be the
fat dots terminating the grey zones. By the remark above, these fat dots are the candidates:
Definition 5. A candidate is any Horn clause of the form B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn)[∨ + q],
where the xis are pairwise distinct, Bi(xi) is a non-empty block for every i, 1  i  n, and
q ∈ Q0.
A grey oracle is any function O mapping every set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6), to a
set of candidates containing all those deducible by grey resolution.
Corollary 6. Let O be any grey oracle. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, white
resolution together with the grey oracle rule: to S add O(S), is complete for every set of
clauses of type (4), (5), or (6). In other words, for every set S1 of clauses of type (4), (5), or
(6), if S1 is unsatisfiable modulo E, then the empty clause can be derived from S1 by white
resolution and the grey oracle rule. Moreover, completeness is retained when removing
tautologies, forward subsumed clauses, and -splitting of clauses not of type (6).
We insist that O(S) computes at least all candidates that can be deduced by grey resolu-
tion. This way, Corollary 6 ensures us that completeness is achieved. To ensure soundness,
we would require O to be sound as well; i.e., we would additionally require O(S) to consist
only of semantically valid consequences of S modulo E.
Not requiring O to be sound is not a problem here, since we only want a sufficient
criterion for ensuring that S1 is satisfiable: what we need is that if ⊥ cannot be derived,
then S1 is satisfiable, and this is completeness. We also need O to be computable.
In fact, we cannot require O to be sound, complete, and computable at the same time,
otherwise white resolution and the grey oracle rule would actually decide the class of
all sets of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6). Since this class contains the alternating two-
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way AC-tree automata of Goubault-Larrecq and Verma [26], which is undecidable, this is
hopeless.
Now finding a grey oracle is hard. In particular, dark grey resolution involves looking
at clauses of all three types (4), (5), (6). Remember we would like to find an oracle by just
instantiating ⊕ as addition modulo n. This is impossible if clauses of type (6) have to be
considered, since we would have to instantiate all function symbols from 0 as well. We
therefore strive to find replacement rules that do not need to look at clauses of type (6).
Notice that the conclusion of dark grey resolution,
(
C ∨ ∨mi=k+1
∨n
j=1 Bij (xij )
)
σ , is
of the form C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn) for some distinct variables x1, . . . , xn not free in
C and some negative -blocks B1(x1), . . . , Bn(xn). Although this form of splitting was
forbidden in Proposition 4, so as to keep some control on the shape of clauses of type (6),
we may imagine modifying dark grey resolution to a rule where the conclusion is -split
right away, and the main premise is given in -split form. Let therefore beige resolution be
Pi(x) (1  i  k)
Pi(f (xi1, . . . , xin)) ⇐ Bi1(xi1), . . . , Bin(xin) + q ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x)
(k + 1  i  m)
_________________________________________________________________
+q ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn
+qj ∨ Bj (x) (1  j  n)
where 0  k  m − 1, x is not free in C, C is of the form
P(g(y1, . . . , yk)) ⇐ B1(y1), . . . , Bk(yk), Bk+1(yk+1), . . . , B(y)
with g ∈ , σ is the mgu of x and all f (xi1, . . . , xin), k + 1  i  m, and therefore(
C ∨ ∨mi=k+1
∨n
j=1 Bij (xij )
)
σ can be written C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn), where x1, . . . ,
xn are distinct variables not free in C, and finally qj = Bj (x). Just like splitting, this rule
generates several clauses, n + 1 to be precise.
For this to preserve completeness, we need to allow for -splitting of clauses of type
(6), and to introduce the following q-resolution rule:
C ∨ −q + q ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm
______________________________ (qRes)
C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm
where C is a non-trivial -clause. Once we do this, dark grey resolution can be simulated
by first splitting the main clause C ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x) into C ∨ −q and +q ∨
−P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x), where q = −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x). Then use beige resolu-
tion to derive +q ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn and qj ∨ Bj (x), 1  j  n. By using q-resolution
with C ∨ −q, we get back C ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x), which is the conclusion of rule
(DGRes). Since beige resolution is just a special case of white resolution, we conclude:
Proposition 7. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the rules of white resolution,
light grey resolution, q-resolution and -splitting are complete.
Unfortunately, Proposition 7 does not state that we may apply -splitting eagerly, which
would be nicer for implementation purposes. This is repaired in the next proposition.
Proposition 8. Let us say that a clause is of type (6′) if and only if it is of the form
C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm[∨ + q], where C is a non-trivial -clause, and q1, . . . , qm, q ∈ Q0.
Let ivory resolution be the following modification of light grey resolution:
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+A′ ∨ C′ ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′m′ C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm ∨ −A
____________________________________________________ (IvoryRes)
(C ∨ C′)σ ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′m′
where σ ∈ csu(A .= A′); +A′ is maximal in +A′ ∨ C′ (not in +A′ ∨ C′ ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · ·∨ −q ′
m′ !) and no literal is selected in +A′ ∨ C′; and −A is selected in C ∨ −A, (not in C ∨−q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm ∨ −A!), or no literal is selected in C ∨ −A and −A is maximal in
C ∨ −A; and moreover one of the premises is of type (6′), and the other is of type (4) or (6′).
Then, under the assumptions of Proposition 4, the rules of white resolution, ivory resolution,
q-resolution and eager -splitting are complete.
Proof. Every clause can be written in a unique way C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn), where x1,
. . . , xn are distinct variables that are not free in C, where B1(x1), . . . , Bn(xn) are non-empty
negative blocks, and n is maximal with these properties. By -splitting, we may derive C ∨
−q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn and +qj ∨ Bj (xj ) for every j , 1  j  n, from such a clause, where
qj = Bj (xj ). Call C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn the splinter off C ∨ B1(x1), . . . , Bn(xn), and
the clauses +qj ∨ Bj (xj ) the definitions of qj ; the qj symbols are the splitting symbols.
The plan of the proof is to show that if we can deduce any clause by white and light
grey resolution, q-resolution and -splitting, then we can deduce its splinter by using ivory
resolution instead of light grey resolution. It suffices to show that for any rule in the first
set, the rules in the second set can be applied to the splinters of the premises to derive
the splinter of the conclusion. This is obvious for white resolution, since -splitting was
already applied eagerly in this case, and also for -splitting. Let us consider the other rules:
• Light grey resolution. Writing the premises in the form C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn),
either we resolve upon a literal in C, or we resolve upon a literal in some Bi(xi). This
means we have the following possibilities. First case:
+A′ ∨ C′ ∨ ∨m′i=1 B ′i (x′i ) C ∨
∨m
i=1 Bi(xi) ∨ −A
___________________________________________
(C ∨ C′)σ ∨ ∨m′i=1 B ′i (x′i ) ∨
∨m
i=1 Bi(xi)
By induction hypothesis, we have derived C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn ∨ −A and +A′ ∨
C′ ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′n′ , where qi = Bi(xi) and q ′i = B ′i (x′i ) for all i; we then infer
(C ∨ C′)σ ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′n′ by ivory resolution. This clause is,
or -splits into the splinter off the conclusion (C ∨ C′)σ ∨ ∨m′i=1 B ′i (x′i ) ∨
∨m
i=1 Bi(xi).
Second case: +A′ on the left is inside B ′i (x′i ) for some i. This is impossible since
B ′i (x′i ) is a negative block.
Third case: −A on the right is inside Bi(xi) for some i. By (iv) and the definition of
sel, the only possibility is that the right premise is of type (4), say B(x) ∨ −P(x)[∨ +
q], where B(x) is a block. Note that it is its own splinter. The left premise is +A′ ∨ C′ ∨∨m′
i=1 B ′i (x′i ) where A′ = P(t ′) for some t ′. Its splinter is +P(t) ∨ C′ ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨−q ′
n′ . By ivory resolution, we infer B(t
′)[∨ + q] ∨ C′ ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′n′ , whose
splinter is also that of the resolvent B(t ′)[∨ + q] ∨ ∨m′i=1 B ′i (x′i ).• q-resolution. The premises are of the form C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn) ∨ −q and +q ∨
−q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′n′ , the resolvent is C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn) ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′n′ .
The splinters off the premises are C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn ∨ −q (qi = Bi(xi) for all i)
and +q ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ −q ′n′ . By q-resolution, we infer C ∨ −q1 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn ∨ −q ′1 ∨· · · ∨ −q ′
n′ , which is the splinter off C ∨ B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn) ∨ −q ′1 ∨ · · · ∨−q ′
n′ . 
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As before, we may infer a corresponding notion of oracle. Please note that, using the
rules of Proposition 8, we now get out of grey zones, not by generating disjunctions of
blocks B1(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ Bn(xn)[∨ + q], rather by producing their splinters B1(x1) ∨ −q2 ∨
· · · ∨ −qn[∨ + q], plus definitions for splitting symbols. The latter include the symbols q2,
. . . , qn but may contain others.
Definition 9. A light candidate is either a clause B(x) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn[∨ + q], where
B(x) is a block, or a definition +B ′(x) ∨ B ′(x).
It is accessible from a set S of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6′), if and only if it is derivable
from S by ivory resolution and q-resolution alone. A light grey oracle is any function O
mapping every set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6′) to a set of light candidates containing
those that are accessible from S.
Corollary 10. Let O be any light grey oracle. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4,
white resolution and the light grey oracle rule: to S add O(S), are complete for every set of
clauses of type (4), (5), or (6′). More precisely, for every set S1 of clauses of type (4), (5),
or (6′), if S1 is unsatisfiable modulo E, then the empty clause can be derived from S1 by
white resolution and the light grey oracle rule. Moreover, completeness is retained when
removing tautologies, forward subsumed clauses, and eagerly -splitting clauses.
This applies in particular to AC-automata clauses, hence to sets S1 of flattened clauses
obtained from sets S0 describing Diffie–Hellman-like protocols (Section 3).
4.5. Finding a light grey oracle
The main value of light grey oracles O, justifying that we did not stop our analysis of
Section 4.4 after Corollary 6, is that the function mapping S to O(S4,6′) is also a light
grey oracle, where (S4,6′) is the subset of S containing just the clauses of type (4) and
(6′). This is because the ivory resolution and q-resolution rules never apply to clauses of
type (5).
Without loss of generality, let us therefore assume in this section that S is a set of clauses
of type (4) and (6′). Note that all terms in such clauses are built on : no symbol from 0
occurs anywhere in S. In the case of the theory AC, this means that the only function
symbol in S is ⊕.
To design a computable light grey oracle, fix a finite model M of the equational theory
E on signature . In the AC case, this is an arbitrary finite semigroup. In practice, we
choose Z/nZ for some small value of n, typically n = 3. But naturally, any other finite
semigroup would fit the bill.
Call M-instance of a clause of type (4) and (6′) any clause obtaining by replacing each
variable by an element of M, and simplifying. Formally, let ρ be an environment, i.e., a
function mapping variables to elements of M, let [[x]]ρ = ρ(x) and [[g(t1, . . . , tn)]]ρ =
Mg([[t1]]ρ, . . . , [[tn]]ρ), whereMg is some n-ary function (e.g., addition modulo n). Now
let [[P(t)]]ρ be the formal atom P([[t]]ρ) for every atom P(t); we call this an M-atom.
Similarly, define the M-literal [[±P(t)]]ρ = ±P([[t]]ρ), and the M-clause [[C]]ρ =
±1[[A1]]ρ ∨ · · · ∨ ±n[[An]]ρ ∨ ±n+1q1 ∨ · · · ∨ ±n+mqm, where C = ±1A1 ∨ · · · ∨
±nAn ∨ ±n+1q1 ∨ · · · ∨ ±n+mqm. An M-instance of clause C is any M-clause [[C]]ρ.
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Our light grey oracle consists in simulating ivory resolution and q-resolution at the level
of M-instances.
To start off, we use an M-instantiation rule: from any clause C in S of type (4) or (6′)
simulate ivory resolution and q-resolution by the propositional version of resolution on
M-instances (without any ordering or selection function):
Lemma 11. Given a set ES ofM-clauses, let Res0(ES) be the set of all clauses deducible
from ES by binary propositional resolution. Let S be any set of clauses of type (4) or (6′),
M(S) the set of its M-instances, and Res(S) be the set of clauses deducible from S by
ivory resolution and q-resolution. Then M(Res(S)) ⊆ Res0(M(S)).
This is immediate. Simulating -splitting at the level of M-instances is more complic-
ated. Notice that the set of M-instances of C ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pn(x), where x is not
free in C, is exactly the set of M-clauses C0 ∨ −P1(k) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pn(k), where C0 ranges
over the M-instances of C and k ranges over M. So let us consider the following abstract
splitting rule
k∈M︷ ︸︸ ︷
C0 ∨ −P1(k) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(k)
_____________________________________ (ASplit)
C0 ∨ −q + q ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x)
where q = −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x), m  1, and C0 is not empty. This reads as follows:
if, given a set S of M-clauses and clauses of type (4), (5), or (6′), S contains all the M-
clauses C0 ∨ −P1(k) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(k) (k ∈ M), for some predicates P1, . . . , Pm, then add
the M-clause C0 ∨ −q and the definition of the splitting symbol q to S.
Finally, we simulate the generation of fat dot clauses at the exit of grey zones (i.e., of
light candidates) using the same idea: this is rule (Exit) below, where B(x) is any block.
k∈M︷ ︸︸ ︷
B(k) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm[∨ + q]
___________________________ (Exit)
B(x) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qm[∨ + q]
We get the following immediate extension of Lemma 11.
Lemma 12. Let S be any set of M-clauses and clauses of type (4), (5), or (6′). Let S|M
the subset of M-clauses.
Let Ded0(S) be the set of all clauses and M-clauses deducible by binary proposi-
tion resolution between M-clauses and by the (ASplit) and (Exit) rules. Let Ded(S) =
Res(S|M).
If S|M contains M(S4,6′), then M(Ded(S)) ⊆ Ded0(S). Moreover, for every light can-
didate C accessible from (S4,6′), C is in Ded0(S).
Proposition 13. IfM is a finite model of E on signature , then the function Ostd mapping
any set of clauses of type (4), (5), or (6′) to the set of light candidates in Ded0(S ∪M(S))
is a computable light grey oracle.
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4.6. Implementing the light grey oracle
The only remaining challenge now is to implement the light grey oracle Ostd of Propos-
ition 13 efficiently.
Let us consider the easier rule (Exit) first. To handle it, we use a table TabExit, map-
ping clauses to natural numbers. We maintain the invariant that for each clause C of the
form ±1P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ ±mPm(x) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn[∨ + q] (i.e., those that may
be the conclusion of (Exit)), TabExit(C) is the number ofM-instances of C that are present
in the current clause set S. Note here that C is not limited to be a clause in S: C is arbitrary.
This invariant is maintained as follows. Initially, TabExit is empty, i.e., it maps every
clause to 0. For each newly generated M-clause in the current clause set S (by M-instan-
tiation, or by binary propositional resolution), first check that it is of the form ±1P1(k) ∨
· · · ∨ ±mPm(k) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn[∨ + q], with the same value k as argument to all pre-
dicates P1, . . . , Pm. If it is of this form, then generate the skeleton clause C = ±1P1(x) ∨
· · · ∨ ±mPm(x) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn[∨ + q], and add 1 to TabExit(C). Notice that this is
only correct provided that ±1P1(k) ∨ · · · ∨ ±mPm(k) ∨ −q2 ∨ · · · ∨ −qn[∨ + q] is in-
deed new, i.e., was not already present in S. This is handled by the subsumption engine.
Now, (Exit) is implemented by producing the clause C as soon as TabExit(C) reaches n,
the cardinality of M: (Exit) is as easy as using a table and counting.
The case of (ASplit) is slightly trickier. As above, create a table TabASplit mapping
pairs (C0,−P1(x) ∨ . . . ∨ −Pm(x)) of a non-emptyM-clause C0 and a non-empty negat-
ive block −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x) to natural numbers. The invariant is that TabASplit(C0,
−P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x)) is the number of M-clauses of the form C0 ∨ −P1(k) ∨ · · · ∨
−Pm(k), k ∈ M, in the current clause set S. Initially, TabASplit is empty. For each newly
generated M-clause C in the current clause set S, if C is not empty then it contains some
literal −P1(k), k ∈ M. For every such k, write C as C0 ∨ −P1(k) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(k), where
m  1 is maximal. Then, for every pair (B, B ′) of subsets of {P1, . . . , Pm} such that B is
not empty, not both B ′ and C0 are empty, and B ∪ B ′ = {P1, . . . , Pm}, then add one to the
entry TabASplit(C0 ∨ B ′(k), B(x)).
This is sound: the only clauses of the form (C′0,−P ′1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −P ′m′(x)) with m′  1
and C′0 not empty such that C′0 ∨ −P ′1(k) ∨ · · · ∨ −P ′m′(k) is C for some k are such that k
occurs as argument of some predicate in C. Then B = {P ′1, . . . , P ′m′ } is a non-empty subset
of {P1, . . . , Pm}, and C′0 is of the form C0 ∨ B ′(k) for some B ′ ⊆ {P1, . . . , Pm} such that
B ∪ B ′ = {P1, . . . , Pm}, namely B ′ is set of all those predicates applied to k in C′0.
For example, starting from C = −P(2) ∨ −Q(1) ∨ −R(1), we get C0 = −P(2) if we
choose k = 1, then we add one to the entry for the pair (−P(2),−Q(x) ∨ −R(x)). This
is the most obvious case, and we get back C by taking the disjunction of −P(2) with
the M-instance obtained from −Q(x) ∨ −R(x) by taking x = 1. We also add one,
e.g., to the entry (−P(2) ∨ −Q(1),−R(x)), corresponding to the fact that C is also the
disjunction of −P(2) ∨ −Q(1) with the M-instance −R(1) of −R(x). We also add
one to the entry for (−P(2) ∨ −Q(1),−Q(x) ∨ −R(x)): the corresponding M-instance
is −P(2) ∨ −Q(1) ∨ −Q(1) ∨ −R(1), which is C again, since the two −Q(1)’s
merge.
Finally, when TabASplit(C0,−P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x)) reaches n, we just add the corres-
ponding conclusions C0 ∨ −q and +q ∨ −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x)) of (ASplit) to the cur-
rent clause set S, where q = −P1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ −Pm(x).
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With this technology, we may then prove:
Theorem 14. Let k be the cardinality of M. Using the light grey oracle Ostd for O, the
resolution procedure of Corollary 10 terminates in time doubly exponential in the size of
the initial set of clauses, and exponential in k.
Proof. We count the number of possible clauses of the each type, as in the proof of
Theorem 3. Let p the number of predicates, f the number of function symbols, a the
maximum arity of function symbols in the initial set of automata clauses. There are at most
4p(2p + 1) clauses of type (4). Since m is not bounded above in type (5) clauses, these
clauses may contain up to 2p literals of the form −qi (remember that Q0 is of cardinality
2p − 1), so there are at most f 4p+pa(2p + 1)∑2pm=0
(
2p
m
)
= f 4p+pa(2p + 1)22p type
(5) clauses. The white resolution rule takes type (4) or type (5) clauses as premises, and
produces clauses of the same type again, as observed in the proof of Proposition 4. Since
the light grey oracle rule only generates new light candidates, no new type (6′) clause is
ever added. So, the procedure of Corollary 10 only generates doubly exponentially many
new clauses.
Now white resolution and the removal of renamed clauses takes time polynomial in the
size of clauses, and clauses never grow larger than an exponential in the size of the initial
set of clauses (as noticed above, type (5) can grow this large), so white resolution steps
only take exponential time each, in the size of the initial set of clauses.
To bound the time taken by Ostd, observe that M-instantiation generates propoicional
clauses formed from a set of pk propositional variables, so there are at most 4pk of them,
and they are of size O(pk). Updating TabExit can be done in polynomial time, while up-
dating TabASplit can be done in exponential time, in the size of propositional clauses, hence
of pk. It follows that the light grey oracle rule takes time O(2pk). The result follows. 
This was implemented as part of the MOP modular platform for automated theorem
proving [38]. We report on experience with MOP on the IKA.1 protocol in the next section.
5. Running MOP on the group Diffie–Hellman protocol
We have already seen how to formalize the group Diffie–Hellman protocol with a fixed
number of principals in Section 3.2, using an associative–commutative primitive ⊕, a unary
function symbol e and a constant 0. Running MOP with a light grey oracle on Z/3Z, we
get the statistics shown in Table 1 for the case with two principals, in Table 2 for three
principals, in Table 3 for four principals. Experiments were conducted on a 1.4 GHz Intel-
class machine with 512 Mb memory and 256 Kb cache memory, running Linux 2.4.3-20.
MOP is written in OCaml 3. Note that the code was not especially optimized; notably, all
hash tables are actually implemented as association lists, and subsumption tests do not use
any indexing technique.
In all cases, the number of initial clauses reported in the following figures is what we
get after flattening the set of clauses describing the protocol, the behavior of the intruder
and the secrecy property. We refer the reader to 3.2 for what these clauses look like.
In the copycat and Dolev–Yao models, we retrieve the standard attack [31]. More inter-
estingly, MOP shows that IKA.1 is secure in the pure eavesdropper model, which was after
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Table 1
Verifying IKA.1 with two principals
Intruder model Pure eavesdropper Copycat Dolev–Yao
Result Protocol safe ⊥ Inferred (may be unsafe) ⊥ Inferred (may be unsafe)
Initial clauses 118 122 162
Created clauses 1364 1530 2313
by resolution 570 544 1244
by splitting 28 23 41
by M-instantiation 729 927 990
by (Exit) 13 12 14
by (ASplit) 24 24 24
Time (s) 1.31 1.64 2.57
Memory (Kb) 2992 3240 3244
Table 2
Verifying IKA.1 with three principals
Intruder model Pure eavesdropper Copycat Dolev–Yao
Result Protocol safe ⊥ Inferred (may be unsafe) ⊥ Inferred (may be unsafe)
Initial clauses 640 655 805
Created clauses 9318 4296 3075
by resolution 3 848 915 452
by splitting 180 87 75
by M-instantiation 4905 2922 2178
by (Exit) 109 96 94
by (ASplit) 276 276 276
Time (s) 69.80 11.72 7.21
Memory (Kb) 6416 5024 4988
all the only model it was designed for [41]. As far as we know, this is the first completely
automated proof of this fact. (The proof by [34] is by hand.)
This verifies IKA.1 assuming that ⊕ is associative and commutative, but it would be
more realistic to consider that ⊕ is an Abelian group law. So take  to consist of ⊕ and
another, unary symbol  (opposite), and E be the theory ACD1 = AC ∪ {(x ⊕ y) ≈
(x) ⊕ (y)}. This is again a simple equational theory: define ||x|| = 1 for every variable
x, ||s ⊕ t || = ||s|| + ||t ||, ||  s|| = 2||s||, and ||f (t1, . . . , tn)|| = 1 + ||t1|| + · · · + ||tn||
for all other function symbols f , then the ordering s E, t if and only if ||s|| > ||t || and
every variable occurs at least as many times in s as in t , is a compatible simplification
ordering. So our construction applies again. We need to add intruder clauses of the form
(a) IC(x) ⇐ IC(x), and clauses (b) chC(x) ⇐ chC(x) in the copycat and Dolev–Yao
models. We also need to deal with the collapsing axioms x ⊕ 0 ≈ x and (x) ≈ x,
and the axiom x ⊕ (x) ≈ 0. This can be handled by the Meadows trick (see Section
2.1): for every predicate symbol P , add clauses P(x ⊕ 0) ⇐ P(x) and P(x) ⇐ P(x ⊕ 0),
P((x)) ⇐ P(x) and P(x) ⇐ P((x)), P(x ⊕ (x)) ⇐ P(0) and P(0) ⇐ P(x ⊕
(x)). Although they are not flattened, all these are clauses of type (6′), so our construction
still applies. The nice thing is that all of these new clauses M-instantiate to tautologies
when M is an Abelian group, and our procedure removes tautologies. Z/nZ is an Abelian
group: so we just need to add clauses (a) and (b), and no clause arising from Meadows’ trick
at all. The choice of n has its importance: the smaller n is, the coarser the approximation
will be, but the generated clause set grows fast as n grows.
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Table 3
Verifying IKA.1 with four principals
Intruder model Pure eavesdropper Copycat Dolev–Yao
Result Protocol safe ⊥ Inferred (may be unsafe) ⊥ Inferred (may be unsafe)
Initial clauses 2020 2060 2460
Created clauses 48 593 11 568 7230
by resolution 11 049 2374 339
by splitting 444 202 156
by M-instantiation 35 937 7863 5610
by (Exit) 323 289 283
by (ASplit) 840 840 842
Time (s) 4 438 97.63 58.65
Memory (Kb) 36252 10 420 9352
Running MOP with this slight modification, we find that IKA.1 is indeed again secure
under the assumption that ⊕ is an Abelian group law. This takes 1.32 s for two participants
(122 initial clauses, 1376 created clauses, of which 570 by resolution, 28 by splitting, 741
by M-instantiation, 13 by (Exit) and 24 by (ASplit)); 75.45 s for three participants (655
initial clauses, 9575 created clauses of which 3772 by resolution, 183 by splitting, 5235
M-instantiations, 109 by (Exit), 276 by (ASplit)); 5632 s for four participants (2060 initial
clauses, 52 190 created clauses of which 10 943 by resolution, 448 by splitting, 39 636M-
instantiations, 323 by (Exit), 840 by (ASplit)). In fact, this can also be shown using n = 2
instead of n = 3. We then obtain that IKA.1 is secure for four participants in 439.18 s (2060
initial clauses, 19 563 created clauses, of which 8932 by resolution, 448 by splitting, 9100
M-instantiations, 283 by (Exit), 800 by (ASplit)).
Currently, verifying IKA.1 with four principals seems to be an upper limit. Notice that
the number of clauses describing IKA.1 with k principals grows as an exponential of k
already. One particularly good news is that, although the light grey oracle rules may seem
unwieldy, they are efficient enough in practice, and the number of clauses generated by the
light grey oracle is in fact small. But n must be kept low: with n = 3, already 45–75% of
all generated clauses are Z/nZ-instances.
6. Conclusion
We have shown how cryptographic protocols using Diffie–Hellman primitives, i.e.,
modular exponentiation on a fixed generator, can be encoded in Horn clauses modulo
associativity and commutativity. In order to obtain a sufficient criterion of security, we have
designed a complete (but not sound in general) resolution procedure for a class of flattened
clauses modulo simple equational theories, including associativity–commutativity. This
provides a sound abstraction of the initial protocol. More than that: our techniques provide
a sufficient criterion of satisfiability for the undecidable class of alternating two-way AC-
tree automata [26].
The second author has implemented this algorithm in the MOP modular platform for
automated proving. While the number of clauses representing the protocol already grows
exponentially fast with the number of participants, this works well enough for small num-
bers of participants. The core of our resolution procedure consists in light grey oracle rules,
which, together with white resolution, are complete; this was the hard technical point of the
paper. Finding a light grey oracle, although seemingly hard, turned out to be feasible using
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fairly simple hashing and counting mechanisms. While our light grey oracle might seem
unwieldy as far as complexity is concerned, experience proves otherwise: it is efficient
enough and does not generate that many clauses.
As a final note, we stress that we have obtained the first fully automated proof of security
of the IKA.1 initial key agreement protocol in the pure eavesdropper model, the model it
was designed to work in [41].
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